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"The great menace to progress is not ignorance but the
illusion of knowledge."'
The first generation of command and control environmental laws of
the 1970s and 1980s achieved substantial improvements in
environmental quality by focusing on the relatively small number of
large, industrial polluters. Much of the low-hanging fruit among these
large point sources has been picked, however, and attempts to extend
command and control approaches to the sources of the remaining
problems have provoked significant resistance.
These remaining
"second generation" sources are often not large point sources, but
numerous, small, diffuse non-point sources, such as the many
contributors to urban and agricultural runoff into waterbodies.
Second generation sources will present a significant challenge to
environmental policymakers over the next twenty years, and these
sources may require radically different prescriptions from the first
* Assistant Protessor, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author would like to express his
appreciation to Linda K. Breggir..lonathan Z. Cannon, .lefrey L. i)unoff'and )avid A. Skeel tbr
comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
I)ANIFi.I. 1BOORSTIN, CLIOI'ATRA's NOSE 7 (1,994).
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generation command and control requirements. The challenge will be
,particularly great because the American public believes a number of
environmental myths that incorrectly attribute the causes of many
remaining environmental problems to industrial point sources, rather
than to individual behavior.a Although much has been written about
the impact on environmental law of the mismatch between individuals'
and experts' perceptions of the magnitude of risks to the environment,
these myths suggest that an equally important mismatch may occur
between individuals' and experts' perceptions of the sources of these
risks.
This essay draws on the new social norms literature to examine one
of the possible reasons for the public misperceptions about the sources
of the remaining environmental problems. The essay suggests that
one of the insights of the social norms literature, the influence of social
meaning on social norms, may shed light on these misperceptions and
may enrich our understanding of the difficulties encountered by efforts
to control second generation sources. In particular, this essay
examines two principal social meanings that appear to have been
conveyed by the command and control system. The first social
meaning is the conventional notion that pollution is bad.' This social
meaning may have been conveyed directly through the prescriptions of
the command and control statutes, and it may have promoted the
development of social norms against pollution. These norms may in
turn have facilitated the development of the command and control
system. In fact, fear that this social meaning will be undermined
underlies much of the criticism of emissions trading systems.'
Ironically, the command and control system also may have conveyed

'2See NATIONAl, ENVIRONMENTAI. E)UCATION & TRtAININ(; FoUNDATION (NEETF),
ENVIR()NMI.:NTAI, REAI)INESS IOR 'IIE '21T' CIEN'I'UIlY (19)9) ["hereinafter 1999 NEETF
CARD
N ENVIONMENTAI. KNOWI.II);E,
Survey]; NEETF, Till: NATIONAL. Ri :I'I
SEVvNTII ANNUAl. SUiRVEY oF AIDUI.T AMEIEICANS (19%)
A'rI'ITI1DES AND BEIIAVIOitS: Ti iE
[hereinafter 99Us NEETF Survey]; NEETF. SUMMARY AND OVEIRVII:W OF 1997 NATIONAL,
Ri-i'o'ir CAR) ON ENVIRONMENTAi. KNOWl.Ii)(;E:. AT'riTUriwS, AND BHIAVIOR (1997),
available at http://www.neett'org/reportcard/ files/97suinmary.doc Ehereinafter 1997 NEETF

Survey Summnary]. The NEETF is a private non-profit organization authorized by Congress in
1990) to study and support environmental education. The surveys were conducted by the
polling firm Roper Starch Worldwide.
' For a recent review of social norms literature, see Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning ,

and the Econonic Analysis of'Law. 27 .1.Li:(;AI. STUD.537 (19.q8).
I See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Innovations in Environmental Polio,: Bevond Cost/Benefit: The
Maturation qf Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequence.1hr Envi'onmental Policynaking,
(20(m)
2(K) U.. lii.. L. REV. 237, 2,14;
protection revolution").
5 See intfa note 62.

(noting the social meaning of the "environmental
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a second, more subtle, social meaning: "individuals" or "citizens" are
distinct from "polluters," and the former are not the source of
environmental problems. Although this indirect social meaning may
have further facilitated the development and implementation of the
command and control system, it also may have reinforced public myths
about the sources of environmental problems. As a result, this indirect
meaning may have discouraged the development of social norms
concerning individual responsibility, and it may be one of the factors
contributing to sharp public resistance to controls on second
generation sources.
The aim of this essay is not to provide a critique of the command
and control system or an argument about the social meaning that
environmental law should seek to create. Rather, this essay identifies
the two principal social meanings that appear to have been conveyed
by the command and control system and explores the implications of
the second social meaning for the future of environmental law." Part I
discusses the emerging understanding of the importance of second
generation sources. Part II reviews recent surveys of environmental
myths and explores the rejection of efforts to regulate second
generation sources. Part III discusses the emerging scholarship on the
expression of social meaning and the impact of social meaning on social
norms. Part IV identifies the social meanings that may have been
conveyed by the command and control system. Part IV also explores
the role that these meanings may have had in shaping perceptions and
norms about first and second generation environmental problems.
Part V examines the types of empirical studies that could help confirm
or disprove the social meaning hypothesis and explores the types of
prescriptions for "meaning management"- that may be available. The
essay concludes in Part VI that the concept of social meaning may help
identify new ways to think about and test the role that environmental
law can play in steering the behavior of second generation sources.
I. SECOND GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

The environmental

laws that imposed command and control

The second social meaning has received little or no attention in the literature, although a
related concept of "scapegoating" has been discussed by Professor Bradley lBolertz. Bradley C.
Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws. Reflections on Scapegoating Theog,
7., Ti.;x. L. REV. 711 (1.9.q,)
(identilying a "scapegoating" theory to explain the transfer of blame
firom the public to others) [hereinafter Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution].
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of'Social Meaning, 62 U. Ciii. L. RI.'V.
91.',
957 (1995)
(identifying mnethods of' meaning management) [hereinafter Lessig, Regutlation of Social
Meaning].
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requirements beginning in the early 1970s have led to significant
reductions in emissions of targeted pollutants and improvements in
environmental quality in the United States." For example, by 1990,
60% of lakes and 70% of rivers were in compliance with clean water
standards, as opposed to approximately one-third in 1972." Similar
improvenents have been measured in ambient air quality. Despite
substantial growth in the gross domestic product, concentrations of
five of the six criteria air pollutants identified by the federal
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") pursuant to the 1970 Clean
Air Act have declined, with reductions ranging from 29% to 98%.!"
Similarly, concentrations of ozone-depleting substances have started to
decrease in recent years." In addition, the construction work on more
than 400 federal Superfuind sites had been completed by 1996, and
numerous other cleanups are under way.' - The improper disposal of
hazardous waste also has declined substantially.''
Despite this progress, the goals of the early statutes have not been
achieved. The Clean Water Act identified a goal of fishable and
swimmable streams "wherever attainable" by 1983, and zero discharge
of pollutants by 1985,'" but as late as 1994 at least 40% of assessed
water bodies were not in compliance with water quality standards. In
addition, approximately 2,500 water bodies in 1999 were under fish

See UNITI) S'I'I.'i-s ENVIIONMEN'I\I, PIRIOTECTION A(;ENCY, SCIENCE AIVISORY
BOAR), INTEI;RATI:I) ENVIRONMENTAL, l)ECISION-MAKIN(; IN TIII: TwENTY-FIItST

CENTURY: SUMMARY RI.,COMMENDA'I'IONS I-'2 ()raflt

Final May 6, 20(X)).

For a detailed

overview of changes in emissions and environmental conditions, see Michael P. VandenlIergh,
Ready, Fire, Aim. A Frameork Approach.1br Linking Environmental Targets in EnvironmentalLaw,
s5 KY. LJ. 80:3, 81 2-2+*())7)
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, Framework Approach].
' See Council ON ENVIRONMI.NAI. QUAI.ITY, ENVIRONMENTAL. QUAIT'Y: TIlE 2'2\1"
ANNUAl. REi
OF"fil: COUNCIL. ON ENVIRONMENTAL° QUALITY 187 (I992); COUNCIL. ON
01T
ENVIRONMENTAL. QUAI.ITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAIITY: Till: 5''' ANNUAl. REi'ORiToimF I"IE
COUNCIl. ON ENVIRONMN'IAI. QUAI.I'Y '286 (1)71.).
" U.S. ENVIRONMENTAIL PR()T1.'(-I'ION A;ENCY, LA'Esr FINI)IN(GS ON NATIONAl, AIR
QUAI.ITY: 15.99.9
STATUS AND TiRENDS (Summary Report) '2 (August 2000) (noting that the six
criteria pollutants are low-level ozone (snog) (measured atmospheric concentrations down
1:.%). carbon monoxide (down '2$%), lead (down .8'%), nitrogen dioxide (up 17%) and particulate
matter (soot) (down 77%)) Ehereinafter EPA 1515)5)
AlI QLAI.ITY RI(i oiT].
" See id. at 'I.
2 UNITED.)
STATi:s ENVIRONMENTAL, PROTIECTION A(;I.:NCY.,'SUPERUNI) RI.jFOlRMS
ANNUAl, REI:oRT FY I997 2-3t (I 998).
)
1-1See UNITE) S'TAiES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTI'ECTION A(;ENCY. RCRA ENVIRONMENTAIL
INI)ICATORS PRO()(;E R I:IirT: 1)5 U I'I)ATE '2-10 (199(6).
i
15

Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101(a)(I)-('2), 3'iIU.S.C. § 1125 I(a)(I)-('2) (1994.).
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTIECTION A(;ENCY, NATIONAL, WATER QUAILITY

INVIENTORY: ifn)5. RI.i'( IllI
QUALITY INVENTORY].

ro CON(iR

ES-I/3 (199).5)

[hereinafter EPA

1991. WAi'EI
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Similar
consumption advisories resulting from toxic pollutants."
concerns exist with air quality. The Clean Air Act required attainment
of standards for criteria pollutants "as expeditiously as practicable, but
... in no case later than three years from the date of the approval of [a
State Implementation Plan]." 17 Yet as of 1999, 62 million people lived
in counties that were out of compliance with at least one of the six
criteria air pollutants.'" Furthermore, although direct releases of
toxics are down substantially from 1987 levels, the total amount of
toxic waste generated has increased."' Solid waste generation in the
United States also has increased from 2.7 pounds per person per day in
1960 to 4.3 pounds in 1994."" Perhaps most important, it is not at all
clear that the United States is on track to achieve the overall national
objective of a sustainable environment identified in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA").'
A significant percentage of the remaining environmental problems
are the result of non-compliance with command and control
requirements by large, industrial point sources and publicly owned
treatment worksY
The EPA recently estimated that the rate of
significant non-compliance by large point sources ranges from 27% for
water permits to at least 7% for air requirements.2" Additional gains in
environmental quality could be achieved through improving
compliance rates and through new laws or regulations designed to
ratchet down the allowable emissions from these large point sources.
The emissions that are the subject of much current debate are the air

EPA I99)9 AIR QUAIxI'Y RI-''OlR', supra note I0, at 1.
Clean Air Act § 110(a), 1.2 U.S.C. § 7601(c)(iv) (1991.).
Is EPA 19o9 AIR QUAIITY R IOI'I', supra note 10, at 2.
I See.. CIARINCE I)AVIES & JAN MAZURIREK, POI,LUTION CONTROL IN TIH LINITEl)
SlATES: EvAIUATING TIlE SYSI'EM 88 (1998) [hereinafter )AVIES & MAZUREIK, POIIU'I)N
CONTROL)I].
STATE'I'ls ENVIRONMEN'I'Al. PRtIOTri-'ION A(;ENCY, CAIiACITlRIZATION O1F
WA\ST'E IN 'IEI U NI'EI) STATES: 1,995 UII)ATE 11[ (8 996).
'21 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1909, Section 101(a) makes it the policy of the
,2( UNI'iEI)

MUNItCIP'AI. SOI.Il

United States to "use all practicable means and measures ... in a manner calculated to fbster and
promote the general welftire, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and f'lfill the social, econom ic anti other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans." 1.2 U.S.C. § I3:11I(a) (19,I.).

2 The principal non-industrial, large point sources are the discharges by publicly owned
treatment works to water bxodies.
'2':1 UNITED)

STATE.S

ENVIRONMI"NTAL,

PIt(YIT'I.l'ON

A(ilENCY,

(_'OMII,IANCI.: ASSUItANc.IE: FlY98 ACcoMI'IlIINTS Ri;I'olr
19.98

ENFORCIMENl' RI'OI'on'].

ENFORtCE.MENTI

8-9 (1999)

AND

[hereinafter EPA

See also Mariane Lavelle, Environment Vise: Lawu, Compliance,

NAT'I.. L..., Aiig. '), I.99, at S-I, S-'2 (noting that a survey of'corporate environmental counsel
f'ound that ahnost 70% of survey respondents reported that their businesses were in violation of
state or federal environmental laws at least once in the prior year).
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emissions from the coal-fired utilities that were grandfathered into the
early Clean Air Act requirements."
Many of the remaining environmental problems are not caused by
large, industrial point sources, however. Instead, these problems are
For
the result of numerous small, diffuse, non-point sources.
convenience, these sources are described in this essay as second
generation sources, and the problems they cause are described as
second generation problems. Examples of second generation problems
include: urban and agricultural runoff; air pollution problems caused by
emissions from numerous small businesses and from increases in the
number and use of motor vehicles; increases in waste generation by
individuals, and many sources of global warming gases. Examples of
second generation sources include the 25,000 to 35,000 dry cleaning
facilities in the United States. The EPA has concluded that their
Similarly,
cumulative environmental impact is significant.'automotive service and repair shops comprise the largest number of
generators of small quantities of hazardous waste of any commercial or
industrial sector. "' The EPA estimates that 74% are not in compliance
with hazardous waste requirementsY
Non-point sources are the leading cause of water pollution in the
One study recently concluded that urban and
United States.
agricultural runoff accounted for 60% of the impaired rivers in the
United States."" Many of the remaining air quality problems also are
caused by non-point sources. Although emissions from motor vehicles
have declined substantially on a per-automobile basis since 1970, the
number of motor vehicles has increased by well over 40 million,' and
the number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per vehicle has increased
by 140%.:'" Emissions of volatile organic compounds from numerous
small businesses and from consumer products are also thought-to
account for a substantial portion of the remaining emissions of the
Over the last decade, an
primary pollutants that form smog.'
21 See Pamela Najor, Rftht to Know: Group Faults Utilities' Toi Emissions, Urges Regulatoi,
Legislative, Fuel Changes, 155 I)AiII ENVT. R.E'P. (BNA) A-8 (August 1.0,2(X)0).
2.5 EPA 1998 ENI.'OIt(CEMIENT RiO I'oT,supra note 23, at +2.
W; It. at 39.
See EPA 1991. WATER QUALITY INVENTORY, supra note 15, at H. (identilying non-point
2
sources as the leading sources of water quality impairment tbr rivers, lakes and estuaries).
Till':
QUAI.iTY:
QLJAITY,
ENVIRONMENT:I.
ON
ENVIItONMENTAI
COUNCI.L
Or. Tii: ' OUNCIL ON ENVIRONMI. NTAL. QUALITY 9 (1990)
TwENTIEiTI ANNUAl. R iirT

(noting that the numbe- of vehicles increased from 89.2 million vehicles in 1970 to I'39 million
in I

,' .
)IT
sutpra note it, at 5.
EPA Ilm9 AlIt QUA! OT REI'
Id. at 6 (discussing tile role of Conslner products i the non-attainment of ground-level
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increasing number of policymakers and academicians have noted the
importance of these second generation sources.:

II.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS

Numerous studies and articles have discussed the mismatch between
public perceptions of the relative magnitude of environmental risks and
experts' views of those risks.:' Perhaps the best example is the public's
ranking of toxic waste sites near the top of all human health and
environmental risks, although expert studies have concluded that the
risk to human health and the environment of such sites ranks far below
that of many others." This mismatch in risk perception has been
identified as one reason why many environmental regulatory programs
do not address the risks viewed by experts as the most important.:"'
A much less examinedd but equally important mismatch also exists
between the public's perception of the sources of environmental risks
and experts' views of the actual sources. Surveys suggest that not only
is the public unaware of its contributions to many of the remaining
environmental problems, it is under the illusion that it is not a
contributor to them."' For much of the last decade, the National
Environmental Education and Training Foundation (NEETF) has

oone standards).
.12

See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Future Environmental Agenda.fr the United States, 6 I. U. CO..

L. REV. r13, 511 (1991) (observing that "the next generation of environmental challenges will

be more intractable, more diflicult problems that fundamentally relate to how we live on the
land and the planet"); William 1). Ruickelshaus, Stopping the Penduhm, ENVTIL. F. 25, 26-27
(Nov./I)ec. 1995) (noting that "the most significant threats to our environment now seem to lie,
not with major industrial sites, but in the habits of ordinary Americans: we like to drive big,
powerful cars, use a lot of electricity, generate a lot of waste, enjoy cheap tbod, live in grassy
sulurbs, and collectively send pollution in massive amou'nts to often distant waterways and
airsheds") [hereinafter Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Penduhm].
:3 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & (ass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy Slate, 6'2 U. CliI.

L. REV. I (1!95) [hereinafter Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatorv State]; Cass R.
Suostein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SI.'I.'OIK U.L. REV. 9(19, 974 (199 I). See aLb
U.S. ENVIRtONMENTAL, PITECTION At;ENCY, SCIENCI. AIVlstmY BoAR, R:(;UIAIINt; RISK
( 9)w).
See also SI'III.N BIiREYER, BREAKING TIE VICIOUS ('IlEd,. 21, tbl..4 (1993)

(comparing EPA assessments and national public opinion polls).
:11See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Stunstein, 4vailabitih, Cascades and Risk Regulation, .51 SIAN. L.
R iv. 683, 697 (1999) [hereinafter Kuran & Sunstein, Availability Cascades]. See also U.S.
ENVIR)NMENTAIL
PROTIEtION AGENY, UNFINISIIED
BUSINESS: A ('OMI'AIAI VI:.
ASSISSMENT oi ENVIRONMENTIL PRtOBILEMS 73-71- (1987) [hereinafter EPA, UNIINSII El)
BUSINESS].

", See Pildes & Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulator, State, supra note 33, at 29.
51"See v,!9.99 NEETF Survey, supra note '2, at 17, '29-33; 1998 NEETF Survey, supra note 2, at
'22-'28; 1997 NEETF Survey Summary, supra note 2, at It.
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surveyed public knowledge of environmental issues.:': The 1998
NEETF survey results were consistent with earlier results and
demonstrated a disturbing pattern of environmental myths. Although
the great majority of the survey respondents rated themselves as
having either "a lot" or "a fair amount" of knowledge about
environmental issues and problems, the survey results indicated that
the public knows less than it thinks it does."'
In addition to concluding that overall environmental knowledge was
remarkably low, the 1998 NEETF study made several findings of
particular importance to the relationship between the command and
control system and second generation sources.:' Overall, the survey
results suggested that environmental myths not only dominate the
public understanding of the sources of environmental problems but
also demonstrate a pattern: many environmental myths involve
misinformation about the role of individuals in creating the problems.
For example, 47% of the respondents believed that the most common
form of pollution in streams is waste dumped by factories, and only
22% knew that urban and agricultural run-off is the more common
source."' In addition, the majority (57%) of the survey respondents
believed that the principal sources of oil contamination of surface water
in the United States are releases from oil tankers and off-shore oil
drilling platforms." Only 16% knew that the largest source is from
individuals changing motor oil and discarding it in storm sewers. 12
Similarly, the respondents to the survey believed that the principal
sources of the electricity they consume do not produce air emissions.
Over 55% indicated that hydroelectric, solar and nuclear power are the
As the study notes, however, the
principal sources of electricity.'
principal sources of electricity are actually fossil fuiel-burning power
plants.
Perhaps not surprisingly given the public's view of its role in
causing environmental problems, the public has reacted very
negatively to many attempts to change individual behavior. EPA
attempts in the mid-1970s to achieve Clean Air Act requirements by

, NEETF Survey, supra note 2, at 3.
When presented with ten quiestions, each containing a myth answer, a correct answer, and
two plausible but incorrect answers, in 7% of the cases the nyth answer received at least a
plurality. See id. at 5.
See id. at 5-9.
' Id. at 0.
:7 See it
'.

H

See id.at 7.

See id. at 7.
Uh.at 6.
'.Id. at 22.
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restricting commuting by motorists in Southern California were highly
unpopular and were ultimately withdrawn." More recent attempts to
restrict emissions of smog precursors from a variety of second
generation sources ranging from consumer products to dry cleaners
have not been well received." Resistance to centralized automobile
7
emissions testing programs has been strong in many states.1
Restrictions on non-point sources of water pollution have been no
more popular."
Efforts to control non-point sources through
watershed planning have been extremely controversial, and after years
of effort only one state has received approval of a unified non-point
pollution control plan to date."'
III. SOCIAL MEANING

A growing body of legal literature in recent years has examined the
role that social norms, or social "rules of conduct," play in extralegal
social regulation."' Much of the literature has focused on whether
consideration of social influences can enhance the explanatory or
predictive value of economic conceptions of individual decisionmaking"' This essay does not address the debate over the relationship
between social norms and economic conceptions of decision-making.
Instead, it examines the importance for environmental law of one of
the concepts advanced by the norms scholars: that laws, and the
programs that implement them, can express or affect social meaning,

5 "See ROBERT V. PICIVAl ET AL,., ENVIIONMENTAIL RI'x;UI.A'ION: LAW, SCII.NCE AND
POLICY 79.5 (1992) [hereinafter PERCIVAL T :AI..
ENVIIIONMENTAIL RI:(;UIAIlON]. See also
Eli Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air ,4ct in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve the Impossible, I.
EcoiO(;Y L.Q. 537 (1975).
" Sae Carolyn Whetzel, 4ir Pollution: Southern Cali/brni Dunips Rideshare Rule, Adopts
Measure Relying on Menu ojOptions, 1915 I)A iIY ENYV'T Ri1:1. (HNA) A-fI, A-10 (Dec. I1, 1995).
I-, See Thomas 0. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air 4ct's I'OC
Emissions Reduction Program in Nonattaiunment Areas, 18 -VA. ENVTI. L.J. I.I,7.1-75 (i )
[hereinafter Mc( arity, Missing Milestones].
11 See I)EWITT 0JIN, CiVIc ENVIRONMENTALIsM: AITERNATIVES 1"oRE(;ULATION IN
S ATES AND COMMUNITIES 10 (I,) I.) (quoting an Iowa firmer who said, "It may take an
occupying army to regulate the I(K),O(X)
ahrmers in our stafte").
P, See, e.g., Carolyn Whetzel, Calflbrnia First State to Receive Approval o1 Unitfed Nonpoint
Pollution Control Plan, 152 I)Aii.,
ENv'T R.:i'. (13NA) A-'3 (Aug. 7, g2(0).
-' See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation q? Groups: The lnfluence q'Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action, 1 U. ('III. L. RINV. :1i
(1516).
See alsoRichard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development and Regulation q Vori;n,96 MICli. L. RIKV. :I:is (1997) [hereinafter McAdams,
Origin of tNormis]; Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic .4nalsis of Law,
I.U. PA. L. RE1V. 21 8 I (15)6).
supra note 3;Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms,, I I.
See ROtIIIT.' C. ElI.,ICKSON, ORDI)It WITlIOUT LAW: HOW NI.I(;I Ill IiS SIIi':
DIISPUTES (1!I!)); I)an M: Kahan,Social lnfluente, Socil .Aleaning,andDeterren, 83 VA. L. RI:V.
1.1
o (1517) -hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence].
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and that this social meaning can play a role in shaping social norms.
The definitions of social norms and social meaning have been the
subject of extensive debate, and a full examination of these issues is
beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to
clarify several terms. For the purposes of this essay, I follow Professor
Richard McAdams in understanding a "social norm" to be an informal
obligation that may be internalized (and enforced through guilt) or
that may arise without internalization (and be enforced through
external non-legal sanctions such as stigma or ostracism)." I follow
Professors Lawrence Lessig and Dan Kahan in understanding social
meaning to be "the frameworks of understanding in which individuals
live."
I also follow Kahan in understanding the regulation of social
meaning to include "all the ways in which the law creates and shapes
information about the kinds of behavior that members of the public
hope for and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear.""'
Professor Robert Ellickson and others have noted that the term social
meaning could either refer to the intended meaning of the actor or the
message received by those who observe an act. Ellickson has observed
that "social reception" might be a better term for the latter use of social
meaning:" Although I am focusing on the latter use of social meaning
in this essay, I have retained the term social meaning because .of its
widespread adoption in the literature and because the term may reduce
ambiguity about the position I am taking regarding the expressive
function of law.
The relationship between social meaning and the expressive
function of law also has been the subject of debate. The social norms
.51

Richard

H.

McAdams,

Law ant

Society &

Law ant

Economics: Common

Ground,

Irreconcilable Diff'rences, New Directions: Comment: Accountinr.r Norms, I997 WIS. L. REiV. 625,
(;I1.(19,957)Ehereinafter McAdains, Accounting.,br Nornm; McAdams. Origin qt'Norts, supra note
50, at :.1). See also Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM.
ECoN. RI.*v. '365 (15)97) (defining a social norm as a "rule that is neither promulgated hy an
otlicial soirce, such as a court or a legislatire, nor entbrced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet
isregularly complied with").
l'
Kahan,
Social Inluence, supra note 5 1, at 3)5 I,n.7 (noting that he is fbllowing the lead of
Lawrence Lessig). See also Cass R. S lnstein, Social Noris antd Social Roles. 9)6 COUM. L. REV.

903, 925 (I9)6) [hereinafter Sinstein,

Social Norms] (delining social meaning as "the

expressive dimension of'conduct (not excluding speech) in the relevant comuntity").
lKahan, Social hItluence, supra note 5 I, at :15 I. See Lessig, Regulation o/Social Meaning, .supra
note 7, at 91-3.
Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economies Discovers Social Norms, 27 .1. LE ;A. STUD. 57,
5 1.5) (1997) [liereinafter Ellickson, Law and Economics].
See also l)elorah Hellman, The

Er'pressive Dimension tf Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. I (2(xx)) [hereinafter Hellman,
Expressive Dimension of'Equal Protection]. The ditikrent uses of social meaning are reviewed in
detail in Lawrence Lessig. The Nezv Chicago School, 27 .1. LE.G;,1I'uI).
(;(;l, (;8(l,-8(; (1 9984); Lessig,
Regulation ol'Social Aleaning, supra note 7, at I )1 -II..
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theorists have drawn upon the uncontroversial notion that the law is
expressive in the sense that it can signal, reinforce or change social
meaning. Examination of the expressive role of law has been
influential in scholarship regarding voting rights districts,"
"endorsement" theories under the Establishment Clause,' "stigma"
theories under the Equal Protection Clause,; and other areas. Some
expressivists have advocated an expansive, non-consequentialist view
of the expressive dimension of state action, arguing that "what makes
an action morally right depends on whether it expresses the
appropriate valuations of (that is, attitudes toward) persons."' "' Others
have advocated a more limited, consequentialist view that examines the
effects of laws, rather than their intrinsic expressive character. To
some, the term social meaning only applies to the latter."
These two approaches to the expressive function of law have been
explored in the environmental area by Professor Cass Sunstein.
Sunste'in has noted that a principal criticism of emissions trading
programs is that by commodifying environmental emissions these
trading programs express the view that environmental amenities are
ordinary goods." Critics of emissions trading who take the more
expansive, non-consequentialist approach have maintained that the
expression of this view of the environment is intrinsically problematic.
Critics who support the more limited approach have maintained that
the commodification of environmental emissions is problematic not
because of intrinsic concerns, but because the commodification will
undermine social norms regarding environmental protection that exist
against the backdrop of the current command and control system.
The more expansive views of the expressive role of law have been
56 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard (. Niemi, E.ipressive Harus, "BizarreDistricts,"
and
Voting Rig/hts: Evaluating Election-DistritAppearances After Sluw v. Reno, 92 M i I. L. REV. *i-:

(I,5:E:).

See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Erpressive Theories q/ Law: .4 General
Restatement, I.8 U. PA. L. REv. 1501-,

(20(X)

[hereinafter Anderson & Pildes, General

Restatetent].
. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminator, Intent and the Taming o]'Brown, 5i U. CIII. L.
REV. 9"15 (mf)9).

See also Hellman, E.xpressive Dimnension afEqualProtection, supra note 55.

5! Anderson & Pildes, GeneralRestatemsen, supra note 57, at 1501..
"I See, e.g., Hellnan, Expressive Dimension qa'EqualProtection,supra note 55, at 5 n. I .
1 (0 ass R. Suinstein, On the Eipres.siv' Function a/Lazo, I I.I. U. PA. L. REV. 202 I, 20 16 (19(i)
[hereinafter Stinstein, Erpressive Function].
I/d. at 201-5 (citing Steven Kelran, WIiAT PRICi. INCI:NTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND TIHE

(noting that a society fIails to make a statement stiginatizing
ENVIRONMENT 27 (l!)81)
polluting behavior" by adopting market nechanisins)). For a Sl niary of' comono themes
among arguments against emissions trading and other market approaches, see Jane 13. Baron &
Jeffirey
L. DlunofW 4gainst Market Rationality:Moral Critiques qf'Economic Analysis in Legal Theory
17 CAIRI)OZO L. REV. .1.11 (199().
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criticized in the recent literature,"" but this essay does not assert an
expansive, non-consequentialist role for the expressive function of the
command and control system. Instead, this essay focuses on the more
limited, consequentialist notion that the public can receive a message
conveyed by law, whether intended or unintended, and that this
message can have an impact on perceptions about the sources of a
problem and on the social norms that develop in response to those
perceptions. The message conveyed in this way is what I refer to as
the social meaning of the command and control system.
Scholars have identified many ways in which a social meaning may
be communicated by state action. For example, the choices reflected in
a law regarding the types of conduct punished, the types of sanctions
used, and the severity of the sanctions can tell us "whose interests it
values and how much."' Professor Richard Pildes has noted that the
public policy programs that implement the choices made in a law also
can include an expressive dimension. "" Pildes has explored the notion
that law and public policy can interact in."complex and subtle ways
with public and private understandings, norms and ideals.""" Pildes
asserts that public programs do not just provide services but "[t]hey
also mean something, whether this meaning is talked about in terms of
their expressive character, their role in sustaining and creating a public
culture, or the way in which understandings of public programs
directly influence their implementation.""-, In this essay, I examine not
only the social meaning expressed by the command and control
statutes and regulations, but the government programs and

See Matthew 1). Adler, E.pr.ssive Theories o/Law: A Skeptical Over-vie., I 1.8L. PA. L. RiV.
1!3631
(20(()); Matthew 1). Adler, Lingvistic Meaning, Non-Linguistic E)pression,"and the Multiple
Variants o/' E.ipressivismn. 4 Repy Response to Profirssors Anderson and.Pildes, 11.8 L). PA. L. Rl.EV.
1577 ('2(X) ). Adleir has criticized the ex pressivists on a niimber of grotindls, including the notion
that expressivism incldes a linguistic meaning. Pildes and Anderson have responded by noting
in part that. in their view, Adle r does not suficiently distinguish between coinu nication
(which is intended to be conveyed by the actor) and expression (which may or may not be). See
Anderson & Pildes, GeneralRestatement, supra note 57 at 156 1-70.
"r

Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 51, at 3162.
See Richard H. Pildes, Slinging Arrowzs at Deinucra,

(I,990).

90 ('I.OiUM. L. REV. 21212 1,1 .- I

Richard H. Pildes, The New Public Law: The Unintended Cultural Consequences q? Public
Polic,: A Comment on the Symposimnm 89 M10 I. L. Ri:\V. 916 (191) [hereinafter Pildes, Unintended
Cultural Consequences]. According to Pildes, there is a causal relationship between lh lic
programs and social understandings in at least three ways: (1) public programs ex press and
embody normns, and therefore "consecirat [e] eertain values"; (2) the implementation of public
programs conveys valies not only to the recipients of Ienefits and services, bt to the pioviders
and distributors; and (1) public priogriams "mediate and constriict relationships" between
inivi ials and the state, I. at 91M-1.
67 Id. at 9 1.2.
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enforcement actions that implement them. For that reason, I refer
throughout not just to the command and control laws but also to the
command and control system.
The relationship between law, social meaning and social norms has
several dimensions.' For example, actions can convey meaning in the
absence of law. Sunstein has noted that the selection of a type of drink
at a social function can convey meaning."" A single malt scotch sends a
different message than a cheap domestic beer. Similarly, Kahan has
suggested that because we expect to share time and experiences with
friends, a failure to do so conveys that the person does not value the
other as a friend or does not know how to do so. Thus, conduct can
signal attitudes and commitments."'
The law can express social meaning directly by taking positions on
particular issues.' Kahan and others have noted that criminal laws can
express meaning directly by signifying particular valuations. Kahan
cites the example of the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which provided
penalties for flag burning." He maintains that few expected that flag
burning would be deterred. Instead, the law's advocates advanced it
less to punish flag burning than to convey support for patriotism and
to delineate the relative status of veterans and protestors._ The law
also can change the social meaning of an action. Lessig has provided
an example of the role of law in shaping social meaning that has been
widely cited in scholarly publications: the social meaning attached to
seatbelt use." As Lessig has noted, the meaning conveyed by buckling
a seatbelt in a Budapest taxi, where no seatbelt is required.by law, may
signal mistrust of the driver. Yet a similar action in a city with a
seatbelt requirement may convey no meaning or, at most, signal that

"ic
holars who have examined the nature and role of social meaning include Lawrence
Lessig, Cass Sunstein and Dan Kahan. See Dan M. Kahan, ll'hat Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
'i:LI. CIII. L. Ri:v. 591 ( 1996); Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 5 I; Lessig, Regulation ol'Social
Meaning, .upra note 7, Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, I-I..
PI. L. Ri-N.
218 1 (199)(; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 5"3. Social meanings are in part the product of'

existing norms. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note .5 1, at 162 (noting that the positions the law

takes against this backdrop thus "become sitthised with meaning").
" Sit nstein, Socitl Norms., supra note 53, at 9" I. (using t lie example of a glass of wi nie 'erstus a
soft drink).
- Sinstein has ftcused on the relationship between social meaning and social roles, noting
that social meaning is conveyed through the way the acts or words confirm with o- violate the
'expectations associated with the role." Id at 927.
71 See Sun stein, Eiressive Function, supra note 61, at 202)-.

72 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 5 1, at

.

63.

73 See Stnstein, Eipressive Fun'tion, sipia note 61, at 2023.
7 Lessig, Regulation of'Social Meaning, supra note 7, at 9)52 (using seatbelt use in Budapest
cabs and tipping in the I.S. as examples).
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the occupant is law-abiding."
Social meaning, whether expressed directly or indirectly, also can
affect norms. Lessig, Sunstein and others have examined the ways in
which the social meaning expressed by law can shape social norms."
This shaping may include reinforcing or changing existing norms,
inducing the creation of new norms, or discouraging their
development. The ways in which the command and control system has
expressed social meanings and the impact of those meanings on
environmental norms are discussed below.

IV. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEANING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The environmental command and control system expresses social
meanings directly, but also indirectly, in ways that may not have been
intended by policymakers or regulators. In Part IV.A, below, I
examine the two principal social meanings that appear to have been
conveyed by the command and control system and explore how both
social meanings may have facilitated the development and enforcement
of laws and social norms concerning first generation problems. In Part
IV.B, I examine the impact of the second, indirect social meaning on
perceptions and norms and suggest why this second social meaning
may now stand as a barrier to the resolution of the remaining second
generation problems.
The Social Meanings of Command and Control

A.

The environmental

laws adopted in the

1970s stated broad

aspirational goals for environmental quality while imposing specific
command and control requirements. The aspirational goals raised the
prospect that a pristine environment was achievable through

75

Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 7, at 952.

Lessig has cited additional

examples of how particilar laws can change the social meanings of actions, inclding tileuse of
hockey helmets. Id. at )67-72. The law also can change behavior by discouraging an action that

conveys a social meaning. Kahan points out that "regulatory norns can reinlrce or suppress
particular meanings" of'actions. He cites the example of laws designed to red ice the nuomlber of'

goins in schools. He notes that prohibitions on gins in school have been ineffecti ye, at least in
part b ecause the prohilbitions increase the social status of those who defy' thein.

Kahan points

instead to a program that pays rewards to school snitches to identity those with gins and thus
discourages students from showing offtheir guns. The program attempts to undercut the valhie
of the guns to the hearer by making the guns less likely to lie displayed. Kahan, Social Influence,
supra note 5iI, at 363-(I. For a discussion of this concept in the popular press, see .leffi'ey Rosen,
The Social Police: Following The Law Because rou'd Be Too Embarrassed Not To, N iw YoitKi"i.,
Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 170,' 171...
76 See Sonstein, Eapressive Function. supra note 61;Lessig, Regulation o/'Social Meaning, supra
note 7.
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implementation of the command and control requirements." The first
social meaning was expressed directly through statutory prohibitions:
polluters and polluting activities are worthy of condemnation. Public
sentiment against pollution increased throughout the decade preceding
the enactment of the environmental laws in the 1970s, and it is
unlikely that these laws created, rather than reflected, the newly
emerging norms against pollution. The social meaning conveyed by
the laws may have signaled a societal consensus regarding pollution,
however, and in that Way facilitated the widespread adoption of norms
against pollution.
Volumes have been written about the reasons for the enactment of
the first generation of environmental laws, with some authors focused
on fhe "politician's dilemma" faced by President Nixon and Senator
Muskie, and others focused on rational Choice, "republican moment"
and other explanations for their enactment.'N I cannot hope to add to
that scholarship in this essay, but I do want to explore one aspect that
has received insufficient attention: the selection of the targets of the
environmental command and control system. Many potential targets
were available to Congress when these statutes were enacted. Among
the sources of contamination were large industries, small businesses,
individuals, farmers, and various federal, state and local government
entities. All contributed in some significant way to the environmental
degradation that was the subject of these laws, yet almost no
requirements were imposed on individuals, and the requirements
imposed on small businesses and some government entities were
minimal in many cases.7 Instead, industrial point sources bore the
7- For example, the Clean Water Act Amendments of' 1972 articulated a goal of fishable and
swimmable waters by i.3s'i and zero discharges by 1,995. See, e.g., )avid 'Shoenbrod, Goals
Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case ,q]'theClean .lir Act, 3to
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 714) (19q831)
(noting
that although the Clean Air Act provided utopian goals, the regulatory prescriptions left nonpoint sources largely unregulated). For a discussion of the goals in the first generation
environmental statutes, see Vandenhergh, FranunworkApproach, supra note 8, at 835.
7' See PERCIVAl. FT Ai., ENVIRONMENTAl, RI.XiUATION, supra note 1.5,at 761. See generally,
E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutiy Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, I I.L. ECON. & ORG. :413 (1985); Christopher H. Schroeder, The Political
Origins qfModern EnvironmentalLaw: Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Erplanationsfir
Environmental Laws, f) I)UKiE ENVTI,. L. & POI,'Y. F. '29 (199)8) [hereinafter Schroeder, Rational

Choice Versus Republican Moment E.iplanation.s.
-1 For example, the agricultural sources of non-point-source water pollution were excluded
from the principal requirements of'the ('lean Water Act. Clean Water Act, §502(II.), 33 U.S.C.
, :162(11.) (I1.)
("agricultural stormswater discharges anti return flows from irrigated
agriculture" are not "point sources"). Perhaps the greatest exception to this analysis is the
requirement finpublicly owned treatment works (POTWs) to meet Clean Water Act standards,
but POTWs were given extended periods to reduce emissions. As Professor Bobertz has noted,
it is clear that the participants in the legislative debates were aware that individuals played a
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brunt of the requirements imposed by the command and control laws."'
As a result, the administrative regulations promulgated by the EPA
and the state environmental agencies were almost exclusively targeted
to industrial polluters. We have become so comfortable with the
notion of the command and control system regulating large, industrial
point sources that it is almost hard to conceive of an environmental
system with a substantial focus on other sources. '
Of course, the bulk of the prescriptions of the command and control
system may have been directed toward industrial polluters, not
individuals and other second generation sources, for a variety of very
defensible reasons. Industrial polluters were the source of many of the
most significant problems from an environmental and human health
standpoint. " Large industrial polluters also were the source of many
of the most obvious problems. The correspondence between corporate
environmental disasters and the subsequent enactment of command
and control statutes has been widely discussed."' Among the most
commonly cited examples are the roles of the Santa Barbara Channel
oil spill and the burning of the Cuyahoga River in the enactment of the
Clean Water Act in 1972.Y
Large industrial polluters also were easier to regulate from an
administrative standpoint." They were fewer in number and more
homogenous than second generation sources. As a result, the EPA
could more easily draft regulations specific to various types of
role in causing some portion of the environmental problems. l3obertz, Legitimizing Pollution,
supra note 6, at 7+5 (quoting Senator Muskie for the proposition that "[ilt is easy to blame
polltution

only oni the large economic inte'ests,

but pollhtion is a by-prod[lCt of' otr

consum ption-oriented society. Each of us imlist bear his share of the blame").
- For example, industrial polluters were and are the subject of the bulk of the requirements

under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the
Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution, supra note.(l,
Resource Conservation and(Recovery Act. See also
at 7 I.I
i.1 76 (noting, "Up to this point, the econonic burdens of' environmental regul atioll have
fallen mainly oil the industrial sector").
69, 7(-7 I, 73-76, 78, 80
at 58-60, 6 f, 6'6,
s. See EPA, UNFINISI 11:)BUSINI:SS, supra note 341.,

(1987).
2 See Jerry L. Anderson, The Envionme'ntal Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RiItERS L. .1.
395, 1-14(H1995) (discussing the role of' environmental disasters in the enactment of
environmental laws). See also Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment E.rplanations,
supra note 78, at I5-17 (discussing the concern fil' human health as a factor in increasing

legislative action to reduce environmental deterioration).
" More recent examples include the role of Love Canal and the Valley of' the )runs in the
enactment of' the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of.
1980, 12 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (19.1.), and of'the Exxon Valdez oil spill in the enactment of the
1.).
"13U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1.99
Oil Pollution Act of'l199,
"I See I)AVI'S AND MAZ.IIIi.:K POILLUTION CON'I'IOL,. spra note 19, at 262 (noting that.the

polhition control system itbcused on point sources inpart because they were "easy to identitfy
and regulate").
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industrial sources.
Similarly, the relatively small number and
homogeniety of large industrial point sources facilitated enforcement.""
The limited scientific understanding of the relationship between any
specific emission source and the environmental conditions affected may
have made the prospect of designing and supporting controls on
individuals or small businesses a daunting task.
In addition, attributing the remaining problems to large, industrial
point sources may simply have been easier for the media to convey and
individuals to understand. " As Professor Bradley Bobertz has noted,
the public may not have been receptive to information that implicated
its own behavior, as opposed to "scapegoating" a third party." To the
extent politicians wanted to respond both to voters' demands for
greater environmental protection and unwillingness to bear the direct
costs and inconvenience of prescriptions directed at individuals, large
industrial polluters provided a politically palatable alternative. Poll
results show widespread public support for the environment," and
some commentators have been critical of environmental agencies'
reluctance to implement environmental laws aggressively."
The
difficult reality for policymakers is that although public support for
environmental protection is widespread, the support is often thin. The
environment is often not among the voter's top concerns, and polls
rarely test the general support for the environment against the costs or
inconvenience that may be borne by the individuals polled."'
Regulation of large, industrial polluters may have provided a way of
satisfying the widespread public demand for environmental protection
without testing the willingness of individuals to bear costs or

See PEIRCIVAL, ENVIIRONMENT'Ai, RI':UIATION, supra note 15., at 94,5 (noting that
nonpoint source controls are difficult
to develop and administer).
' See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, Availability Cascades,supra note 3-1.,
at 72:.
See Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution,supra note 6, at 7 15.
See Thomas L. Osterhaus, Pro-Social Consumer hnfluence Strategies: lW'hen and How Do They
Work? 63 .1. Marketing 16 (3997) (noting that poll results suggest that 75% of Americans
consider themselves to be environmentatists).
" See, e.g., Mc(;arity, Missing Milestones, supra note 4.7at 96-97 (discussing EPA's fhailure to
implement the "milestones" program under the (lean Air Act, under which certain states were
required in their State Implementation Plans to achieve a gradual decrease in volatile organic
chemical emissions over a set period of'years).
"" See Margaret Kriz, Candidates Present Clear Choices, 17 ENVIL.. F. 6 (July/Aug. 2(t)X)
(noting that "[g]reen issues rarely rank among the top reasons why Americans select one
presidential candidate over another"). See also Joel Connelly, Local Efjbrts Reflect Global Goals;
Healthy Environment ConsideredA Right, SI:ATE'i.
POS.-INI.LJ(;I.NCIt, Apt'. 2 1, 2(X)(, at AI
(quoting William Ruckelshaus fir the proposition that "-ilfyou go, into any city, 80 percent of
the people would agree that the Clean Air Act should he strengthened,...[b]ut if'you ask them
to spend '20 minutes a year in a vehicle inspection program, 80 percent will resist").
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inconvenience directly."'
The prescriptions of the command and control system also may have
been directed principally toward industrial polluters for reasons that
may be less explainable from an instrumental perspective. One
potential reason is the avoidarnce of cognitive dissonance."" Cognitive
dissonance is the inability to hold contradictory views of oneself at the
same time."": For environmental law, the important aspect of this
phenomenon is the difficulty for an individual to believe both "I
support protection of the environment" and "I am a polluter."
The second, indirect social meaning conveyed by the command and
control system may have provided a means of avoiding this cognitive
dissonance: industrial polluters are the source of environmental
problems, and individual citizens are enforcers allied with the
government to stop them.'
Indeed, despite the role of second
generation sources in producing the remaining environmental
problems, many descriptions even today speak only in terms of
"industrial pollution."'
The command and control system thus
allowed individuals to support environmental protection by focusing
both economic costs and moral opprobrium on industrial polluters.
Simply put, individuals could now say "I support protection of the
environment" and "they are polluters."
This second social meaning may have been conveyed indirectly by
several aspects of the command and control system, including the
choice of targets for regulation, the choice of targets for data
collection, and the legal mechanisms provided for enforcement. Social
meaning was expressed indirectly through the identification of the
sources of the problem and the selection of the entities that must
change their behavior. When the sources of a problem and the targets
are clear, the notion that the selection of targets can convey a public
meaning is an unremarkable proposition.
Thus, when the law

Professors Koran & Stnstein have noted that a locus on industrial requirements may
sensitize the public to the risk regulation benefits of new controls without also sensitizing the

public to the costs of'the controls. See Kuran & Sunstein, 4vailability Cascades, supra note 35.,,at
721.

112Professor Kahan has noted that avoidance of cognitive dissonance is one potential reason
why individuals have been tbund to adapt their moral convictions to that of their peers. Kahan,
Social Influence, supra note 5 1. at "5X-59.
" See Kahan, Social Itfluence, supra note 51, at 358Xn.4.2 (citing LEON FEST IN(GERt. A TIIi: OiY

01' COGNITI VI: )ISSONANCI: (I957)).
' Former EPA Administrator William Ruckeshaus has commented on the implications of
this aspect of environmentalism. See Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulur, supra note 312,at '26'27.
See Kuran & Sunstein, Availabili , Cas,'ade., supra note

1,, at 720.
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sanctions bank robbers for robbing banks, the identification of the bank
robbers as the targets of its sanctions in and of itself conveys only
limited social meaning. But when there are a variety of potential
sources and targets, this selection of targets can convey a strong,
indirect (and unintended) social meaning. The social meaning can then
affect public perceptions about the sources of the problems and the
social norms that influence behaviors associated with those problems.
As discussed above, the command and control statutes directed the
vast majority of their prescriptions toward industrial polluters. With
the notable exception of Clean Water Act controls on publicly owned
treatment works, state and local governments were not the target of
much activity. Small businesses either were not subject to or were
exempted from many requirements."' ; Individuals were the subject of
few requirements, and, as discussed above, many of those were
withdrawn after a public outcry.
The data collection and dissemination required by the command and
control system also may have conveyed this indirect social meaning.
The command and control statutes required large point sources to
generate and submit data on emissions to the EPA and state agencies.
Those data then became the subject of government and media reports
on pollution and polluters. Although the Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI)" is the product of new thinking about the use of information
disclosure to change behavior, the TRI requirements reflect much of
the old thinking about sources found in the command and control
statutes. The reporting obligations again fall almost exclusively on
large, industrial sources. Individuals and small sources are exempt."
Although the costs and practical difficulties of administration may be
sufficient to explain the focus on large sources, the end result is the
same: The government publishes annual reports underscoring the
emissions of industrial sources, without any accompanying information
about second generation sources. The public then receives'this
message through annual media reports on the trends reflected in the
TRI data.
For a discussion of small businesses and the regulatory state, see Richard .1.Pierce, Small is
Not Beaut.iit The Case Against Special Regulator, Treatment of'Small Firms, 5o ADMIN. L. RiV.
5.37, 559-6o (I 99) (explaining that sinall tirms are not sub.ect to many emissions controls and
that emissions friom small firms remain at levels existing prior to the Clean Air Act)
[hereinafter Pierce, Small is Not Beantifid].
"- See Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, § 313, .1.2 U.S.C. §11023
u 1.).
" See id. § 11023(b) and (0 (exempting firom Toxic Release Inventory reporting any
manutfiturer with ten or ftiwer employees, producing less than 25,(XO pounds of listed
substances, or using less than (O,(X)O(pounds of the i:egkllated stubstances).
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The enforcement mechanisms of the command and control statutes
and their implementation by regulatory agencies also may have
conveyed the indirect social meaning.
Stringent enforcement
mechanisms were provided for agency use against industrial polluters,
but more attenuated means of achieving compliance were provided in
many cases for use against individuals, small businesses, and
government entities."" This approach has only continued in recent
years, with Congress providing breaks to small businesses""' and
restricting EPA enforcement against the Department of Defense under
a number of environmental statutes."' Not surprisingly, industrial
polluters were the subject of the bulk of the enforcement actions taken
against the various potential targets of the command and control
system. The enforcement actions taken against industrial polluters
then triggered additional media attention and reinforced the notion
that industrial polluters are the source of environmental
contamination. i-2 Although federal, state and local government
entities, small businesses and individuals have been substantial
contributors to environmental problems, enforcement against these
sources has been more limited.""'
Citizen suit provisions also may have conveyed the second social
meaning. The Clean Air Act,"", Clean Water Act,"' Resource
"' For example, stibstantial enforcement penalties are provided finnon-compliance with

many Clean Air Act requirements, but these penalties are imposed on regulated sources, which
are predominantly indistrial point s,,irces. See Clean Air Act § 11t3, I.2 U.S.C. § 71.3 (1 :5.).
Programs directed at second generation problems, such as the Employee Commute Options
(ECO) program under the Clean Air Act, .1.2
U.S.C. § 751 la(d)(I)(B), have been interpreted to
provide for entircement against employers, not individuals. See Approval and Incorporation of
Employee Commute Option Program in the State Implementation Plan; Indiana, (iO
Fed. Reg.
12695, 12I.
96 (Mar. 8, 1995) ("employees will not ,iace
penalties fbr not meeting the ECO
re(ilirements"). In addition, only limited enfiorcement has been taken against employers who
are subject to ECO program requirements. See, e.g., DEQ Issues First Fines to Employer Over
Auto Commuting Reduction Compliance, 2:32 Daily Envt. Rep. (BNA) A-It (Dec. I, 2tktO)
(indicating that the first penalties issuied under the Oregon. ECO program were all under $.I.,(t)O
per employer).
Pierce, Snull is Not Beautfil, supra note 96, at 5411-1.2.
See, e.g., io U.S.C. § 270:(e) (imposing restrictions on payment ofenvironmnental penalties
by the I)epartment of I)efense). For a discussion of recent attempts to narrow some limitations,
see Draft Bill Wouhl Wipe Out DOD's Inunit ' to Environmental Laws, SUI'II.UND RI-T. 8-!)
(Nov. 27, '2OX).
1("2See lobertz, Legitimizing Pollutioi supra note I, at 7 19-25 (discussing media portrayals of
environmental problems).
io'See generally UNITEI) STATI.S ENVIRONMENTAI PIRTIECTION A(;ENCY, ANNUAl.
R i:I'()or ON EN I'tOItCI.M ENT AND CtOM'.IANCE ASSU IANC: Acc)MIi.iSIIMENTS IN 1999
(20Mt).
I- Clean Air Act § '301, 1.'2U.S.C. § 7(0)1- (15)51.). Although initially citizens could only seek
to have EPA take action or order a source to comply, the 199o Clean Air Act Amendments also
provided fir citizens to seek civil penalties.
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Conservation and Recovery Act,'"". and other federal environmental
statutes include citizen suit provisions to supplement government
enforcement.'-, In addition, a number of state environmental statutes
include citizen suit provisions. Many of the federal and state citizen
suit provisions place citizens on the same side of the table as federal,
*state and local governments in enforcing the laws. Although citizen
suit provisions provided greater incentives for compliance by industrial
polluters, they also may have furthered the notion that individual
"citizens" are distinct from "polluters."'"
In sum, the structure and implementation of the command and
control system may have not only condemned pollution but conveyed a
second social meaning: Industrial polluters are the sources of
environmental problems, and individuals are part of the solution, not
part of the problem. This focus on industrial polluters may well have
been the most appropriate choice from the perspective of trying to
achieve the greatest initial gains in environmental protection at the
least cost. The focus also may have facilitated the enactment of
environmental laws by providing politicians with a politically palatable
alternative and by enabling individuals to avoid cognitive dissonance.
This focus also may buttress current public support for the command
and control requirements that have produced substantial, measurable

(1991.). Section 505(a) provides that any person
, Clean Water Act § 505, 3'3U.S.C. § 1'365
"having an interest which is or nay le adversely affected" may commence a civil action against
any person tbr violation of any effluent standard, limitation or order, or against EPA fbr failire
to pertbrim a non-discretionary dity. IL Citizen groups often bring actions hased on a
permitee's submissions of discharge reports indicating emissions that exceed permitted levels.
'(," Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 7(X)'2, +2 U.S.C. § ( 97'2 (I991.).
Citizen suit provisions were included in the original RCRA provisions and were expanded in tile
19s1. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to inclide situations in which past or present

managemnent or disposal of hazardous wastes contributed to an imminent or substantial
endangerment.
60 (1987) (noting
1(7See (;waltney ofSmithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 4-81. U.S. 1.9,
that citizen suits are "meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action").
Many of these provisions provide citizens with an action against polluters in violation of
emissions limits and against agencies fbr failing to pursue certain non-discretionary dtuties.
1118Some citizen suit provisions also allow citizens to sue government agencies to fbrce
agency actions. See, e.g., 1.2 U.S.C. § 6i972 (1991). In the years since the enactment of the
Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") in l1980, it
has become clear that industrial polltiters, if given incentives, are willing and able to pursue
Their resources,
aggressively other polluters to recover environmental cleanup costs.
knowledge of other industries and obligation to pursue their economic interests produced an
explosion of' Soperfiund cost recovery litigation in the late 1980(s and early 1990s. Indtistrial
polluters have an interest in requiring competitors to comply with environmental laws, yet, with
the RCRA citizen suit provisions fr recovery ot'cleanup
the exception of recent attempts to rise
costs where CERCLA is unavailable (e.g., tbr cleanup of ietroleuin releases), corporations only
rarely utilize citizen suit provisions.
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gains in environmental quality. As discussed below, the indirect social
meaning conveyed by the command and control system also may have
had an unintended consequence: It may have strengthened the barriers
to achieving further improvements in envirbnmental quality."
B. Perceptions,Norms and Second GenerationSources
Even without the expression of any social meaning by the command
and control system, substantial barriers exist to regulating individual
behavior. Identification and quantification of the impacts of particular
second-generation sources on the envirbnment can be extremely
difficult.'"' Tailoring requirements to these multiple, diffuse sources
and designing efficient enforcement programs also can be difficult. To
the extent legislative and executive responses to environmental
problems are facilitated by major eco-disasters with easily-identifiable
villains, these responses may not occur if the problems are accretive
rather than sudden and catastrophic, and the villains are millions of
If a "republican moment" was
individuals or small businesses.
triggered by the public's response to the environmental disasters of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, will the slow, largely villain-less
degradation caused by second-generation sources trigger a similar
moment?"
The indirect social meaning conveyed by the command and control
system may have strengthened the barriers to governmental responses
to second-generation problems in several ways. Although certainly
not the only factor, this social meaning provided much of the context
Tile perception is also facilitated by a variety of cognitive heuristics in the way
individuals perceive risks. See Kor-an & Sunstein, Availability Cascades, supra note 1., at 709.
11" See I)AVIFiS & MAZUiREK, POI.UTION CON'I'TOL, supra note 19, at 262 (noting that nonpoint source pollution is inore difficult to regulate and control than point source-based pollution
because "it usually resilts from iiulnerous, geograliically dispersed sources each emitting
relatively small quantities of pollutants").
"

The citizen-consiluer distinction iay lie another barrier to effim'ts to address second

generation sources.
views of individuals
seek results that do
disconnect between

As Sunstein has noted, researchers have identified a distinction between the
as citizens and as consutmers. Individuals in their capacity as citizens may
not reflect their market behavior. This phenomenon may help explain the
citizen support fil- environmental laws and consumer behavior that often

does not reflect a concern filr the environment. The phenomenon also may have facilitated the

enactment and implementation of the command and control system by allowing citizens to
support policies that did not directly implicate their consumer behavior. But with some second
generation environmental problems, where individual consumer behavior is the source of the
problem in the first place, and external sources subject to traditional regulation are not

implicated, policymakersinay thee a particularly diflicklt challenge. See Sunstein, Social Nornvo,
supra note 513, at 923-25. The distinction between the citizen and the consiuner has been
TIl: ECONt)MY O1 Till",
explored by Mark Sagofl amiong others. See, e.g., MARK A( ;i',
EAIn II (1988).
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for the public myths about the causes of environmental problems. The
NEETF surveys suggest that individuals believe that their behavior
does not have significant environmental impacts.. The indirect social
meaning of the command and control system may have reinforced this
perception, and the media may have perpetuated it by reporting on the
toxic emissions of and major enforcement actions against industrial
polluters.
The indirect social meaning also may have inhibited the
development of social norms against individual behaviors that
contribute to environmental problems. Not surprisingly, with the
.possible exception of a small handful of hardcore environmentalists,
social norms that reflect the role individuals play in causing second.generation problems and that stigmatize relevant behaviors are not
prevalent in most communities. At this point, it is not possible to
establish a causal relationship among the social meanings conveyed by
the command and control system, the public misperceptions about the
sources of second generation environmental problems and the absence
of norms regarding individual environmental responsibility. At the
same time, it is not hard to envision that the public misperceptions and
the dearth of norms might not exist today if the social meaning
conveyed by the first generation of environmental laws had been one of
In short, the indirect social meaning
individual responsibility.
conveyed by the command and control system may have facilitated
public myths about the role of second generation sources. This social
meaning and the perceptions it facilitated in turn may have impeded
the development of norms regarding individual responsibility for
'
environmental problems. 1
As the social norms scholarship has made abundantly clear, social
meanings and influences form a complex web of factors that influence
behavior in the absence of law and that affect reactions to law.
Individuals have not received the social meanings of the command and
control system on a blank slate, but rather against a backdrop of
material desires, pre-existing norms, legal requirements and other
factors. In some cases, conflicting social norms and meanings may be
in play. Desire for the demonstration of status through material goods
An obvious problem here isthe substantial popuIlarity of recycling programs. I ndid itIals
recycle at sirprisingly high rates hut do not by green products or act inother environmentally

ftiendly ways at similar rates. An optimistic view would suggest that recycling programns
demonstrate the ability of law to shape norms in the environmental area. A less optimistic view
would suggest that recycling is only a minor inconvenience and provides an expiation of guilt,
and as a result does not stiggest sulccess fin- efbrts to shape norims concerning other
environmental issules.
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has an obvious impact on consumption. Individuals express strong
support for less government intrusion and more protection of the
Individual freedom from
environment at the same time.'"
intrusiveness is highly regarded.'" Deep-seated notions of individual
freedom, open space, and the frontier mentality, as well as concerns
about basic needs such as education and safety, may affect perceptions
and norms about many second generation problems.
It is fair to ask whether, in light of this complex web of factors, the
notion of the social meaning of the command and control system can
add valuable insights to our understanding of environmental law. Is
the web too complex or the concept too vague to test adequately? If
tested, can the concept add to the predictive value of our assessments
of future behavior and to our ability to develop prescriptions? Only
further work will tell, but in the next section I identify several ways to
test the existence and contours of the social meanings of the command
and control system, and I suggest the types of general and specific
prescriptions that the concept of social meaning may lead us to in the
fil t Ure.
V.

TESTING AND CHANGING SOCIAL MEANING

Although I am not a social scientist, the thesis of this essay - that
the social meanings conveyed by first generation statutes may have
made progress on second generation problems more difficult suggests an extensive empirical research agenda. In the sections that
follow, I briefly outline the types of inquiries that could help confirm
or disprove the social meaning thesis presented here. Assuming that
the social meaning thesis finds empirical support, I then briefly identify
several strategies that might prove effective in addressing second
generation problems. The goal here is not to develop a detailed set of
prescriptions for the nation's remaining environmental problems.
Rather, it is to identify ways to test the thesis I have presented and to
begin a dialogue about how to use the relationship between law and
social meaning to address many of the most intractable problems on
the environmental agenda."

I :, See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Impasse Mirrors Coitr,'s ,4mbivalence on Modern Role qJ'Government,
hiinds al)oit the role of'
WASII. POST, No%. 19, 199,.5, at A9 (noting that "Anericans are of two
their government. They want its protections Illt not its intrltsions; its henefits Irit not its
('oStS").

I I See I)AVII.'S & MAZUIEIi,

evalhlation

POIO.I' )N CO)NTR'l1OL., supra note 19, at 170 (noting that "an

of' the polhition control

regulatory system

would

be

inconplete

without

consideration of'how that system measures up with respect to lionintrttsi'eness").

I

Social norns theorists di l lron whether it is advisalble for govern ment to engage in social
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One of the outcomes of the social norms scholarship is an increasing
cross-fertilization of legal scholarship with social psychology,
sociology, and anthropology. Although social science research results
are often indefinite, and the schools of thought in some of these fields
have been described as a "swamp,"'"' collaboration among social
scientists and legal scholars is likely to increase. If the field studies of
Professor Ellickson and others is any indication, social norms
scholarship may lead other legal scholars and social scientists to
conduct additional empirical studies of human behaviors relevant to
law, and the results may challenge some widely held assumptions."

In that light, it may be possible to test the notion that the command
and control system has expressed social meanings about pollution
caused.by second generation sources, as well as the impact of those
social meanings on social norms. Research could be conducted
through survey techniques or laboratory studies into whether
individuals receive a social meaning when they learn about the
selection of targets for regulation and the subsequent enforcement
against those targets. Do individuals who are not exposed to these
messages have different views of the sources of the problems? Do they
hold or develop different norms about the appropriate conduct of the
sources? Research also could be conducted into the contours of the
message received. For example, do individuals generalize accounts
about a particular pollution incident to broad categories of sources or
problems? On a more specific level, research also could be conducted
into the role that social meaning may play in attempts to steer
behavior. The social meanings of statutes or agency actions could be
identified and their utility for steering specific behaviors could be
assessed. The space limitations of this essay only allow me to scratch
the surface here, but I discuss below several examples of these general
and specific approaches to changing social meaning.
B. Meaning Managementfor Second Generation Sources
The examination of the social meanings conveyed by the command
meaning management. See generally, McAdams, Accounting.fin" Norm.s supra note 52, at 63.5-36t
(noting different views on the appropriate role of the state). Lessig has noted that although the
puiulic reacts negatively to explicit government management of social meanings, "social
meanings are collective goods, and collective action is needed ...to change collective goods."
Lessig, Regplation 9?/Social Meaning,supra note 7, at 1022.
1 Ellickson, Law and Economics, supra note 55, at 5 lo. (citing Arthur Left).
d.7
L at 551-52. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opling Out o]the Legal Sl'ltenl' ErtralegalContractual
Relations in the Diamond Industy, 2 I. L At STUD. 115 (1992).
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and control system suggests several potential prescriptions. These
prescriptions include both methods of changing the social meaning
conveyed by the command and control system on a general level and a
new range of tools for using social meaning to induce changes in
specific behaviors that may be contributing to second generation
problems."5
1. Shifting the General Social Meaning of Command and Control
Overall, the prospects for large shifts in norms based on small
changes in social meaning may be surprisingly good. Sunstein and
others have suggested a variety of ways in which "norm cascades" can
occur.'"' According to McAdams, the expressive function of laws can
create or strengthen norms by signaling an existing societal consensus
and by "providing the concrete norms that define compliance with
internalized abstract norms.""-' This is particularly important when a
weak consensus exists, because of what psychologists have called the
"false consensus" effect."" State and local smoking prohibitions are one
example of laws that signaled a consensus and thus may have led to
stronger social norms against smoking.'Several approaches may be available for shifting the general social
meaning conveyed by the command and control system.'S One
approach is to enact legislation that is not only designed to achieve
specific regulatory ends but to convey a general social meaning about
the environment that will counteract the indirect meaning conveyed by
the command and control system. The 'new legislation could signal a
greater emphasis on individual or other second generation source
responsibility for environmental problems. This new social meaning of
I11 Lessig has discussed meaning management techniques in detail, and has proposed two
types of semiotic techniques (tying and amliiguation) and two types of' behavioral techniques
(inhibition and ritual). See Lessig, Regidation a/'Social Meaning supra note 7, at 1009-I-..
I " Kiunan & Sunstein, Availability Cascades, supra note 3...
120 McAdams, Orikin Y'Norms, supra note 50, at 100.
,2 Id. at .14)1.
"!' To the extent a message must he "sticky" to gain widespread acceptance, a framework of
desired environmental conditions may le necessary for pulblic understanding of the role of
individual actions in causing and preventing unwanted environmental impacts. See MAI .c()Im
(IYAI)WI"I , T ili TiI'iIN(; POINTr
)-I[1 (1999) (noting tile importance of "tie stickiness
ftctor" of' an advertising message); Vandenergh, Frarn'2orkApproach, supra note 8 (discussing
tie role of'f'raneworks fin" decision-making).
I." Another approach is to attack the unintended social meaning o'the conmnand and control
system directly through edutcation.
This is all important option, and calls fir greater
environmental education may have more fi)rce fur second generation prolblems than fil' tirNst
generation prolems, since options other than education may ie unpalatable. But the current
allocation of resounIces often is the prodict of' a careflul (and difficult to change) balance between
competing econom ic, political anmid
social interests.
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individual responsibility could be conveyed by including requirements
for individuals and small businesses in the legislation, with measures to
ensure that the environmental benefits are communicated to them.' +
Under this approach, the specifics of the directive may be less
important than the new social meaning that is conveyed.
Steering the Specifc Behaviors of Second GenerationSources

2.

The concept of social meaning also may lead to the development of
new tools for steering the specific behaviors of second generation
sources. A substantial amount of research will be necessary before any
particular option can be advocated with any degree of comfort, but I
will discuss two concepts as food for thought: (1) the use of "tying"
strategies; and (2) the use of social meaning in decisions affected by the
willingness to accept/willingness to pay concept. These and related
approaches may provide new tools for policymakers and regulators
now choosing between intrusive, expensive command and control
mechanisms and economic incentives such as taxes or subsidies that
may be unpopular orldifficult to implement.
Tying. Lessig and others have suggested that the social meaning of
an action can be changed by tying desired new concepts or actions to
concepts that are already popular. 2-" Alternatively, undesired concepts
or actions can be tied to unpopular concepts. These techniques are
popular with marketers and salespeople. "" To address second
generation sources, the law could be used to tie individual actions to
the environmental harms they cause. One current example of this is
the stenciling of "Chesapeake Bay Watershed-Don't Dump" that
occurs on storm sewers in Northern Virginia. The stencils do more
than simply inform the potential dumper of used motor oil in the storm
sewer of the environmental implications of her action; they give social
meaning to an act that was otherwise innocuous. This may facilitate
the development of norms against dumping.
Similarly, McAdams has suggested that the law can be used to
publicize a consensus that a particular concrete behavior is necessary
I

One approach that has had some impact in Europe is the dev'elopment of take-back

requirements for various colsltle gools, such as aLtomolbiles and constiller electronics.
Take-lack programs typically reqire the inantif ctlrer or importer of a cosnlser good to take

the good ack fi'om the consumer at the end of its usefih lifi . Take-hack laws have been
controversial in the United States. See Northeast First Batt kground.1hr
fIVanqla;ctmr
r?"Take-Back
La .; SUI'E:II'UN ) Ri.,I,. 1 (lan. .5, 2(XX)).
I'.,5See Lessig, Regulation q/SocialMeaning, supra note 7, at (109; Robert Cialdini et al., Social
Motivations to Comply." Norns, 'alues, Principles, in 2 TAXPAYIER CONIII.IANCI: 220-22 (.lelfiey A.
Roth & IJohn T. Sholz eds., I989) [helreinafter Cialdini, Social Motivations].
120 Cialdini, Social Motivations, supra note 125, at 2'20.
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in order to comply with an abstract internalized norm.'2 As a result,
McAdams
engaging in such concrete behavior will produce guilt.'
notes that child safety seat laws had this effect by tying the abstract
norm that "good parents provide a safe environment" to the concrete
obligation to provide and use a child safety seat, enabling internal
enforcement through guilt."') To the extent concrete, non-internalized
norms generate less allegiance than do abstract, internalized norms,
the concrete norms may be the ones most susceptible to Sunstein's
norm cascades. Social scientists could study the operative abstract,
internalized norms and concrete behaviors of various second
generation sources, and look for the effects of tying new second
generation behaviors to the relevant abstract, internalized norms.
Recycling requirements, which have been surprisingly well received in
many areas, may already accomplish this fimction for some -household
waste problems. "
Willinlgness to Accept/JVillingness to Pay. Sunstein has explored the
role of social meaning in an area of particular importance to second
generation problems. He has noted that an individual's willingness to
accept ("WTA") is often double the individual's willingness to pay
("WTP") for the same outcome, but that for environmental issues, the
WTA is often much greater, as high as 75 times or more the WTP."
In short, people require a .much higher payment to allow the
destruction of an environmental good than they are willing to pay to
prevent it. Sunstein ascribes this difference between WTA and WTP
to social meaning: the risk of shame that may be imposed on an
individual who was willing to "sell" (accept payment for) an
irreplaceable public good is far greater than the risk of shame created
by the notion that the individual was not willing to act (pay) to prevent
its destruction. This may arise from the perception that accepting

127

McAdams, Origin q'Norts,supranote 50, at 117.

.,, hi.

. at 1(08. This abstract/concrete tying phenomenon may explain Sunstein's point that
"social conditions are often more fragile than night he supposed because they depend oil social
norms to which ... people may not have I1muich allegiance." So nstein, Social Norms, supra note 5',
at 909.

I:' Another possible method of changing the social imeaning of an act is to cause the meaning

of the act to become ambiguous. Lessig, Regulation qfSocial Meaning, supra note 7, at W010- 11.
This amliguation of social meaning then may undercut the symlolic value of the act. The
example cited by Lessig is the wearing by many

)anish citizens of yellow stars to bIlt

the

meaning intended by the Nazis. See id. The ambiguation can occur through preventing the
display of syll1lXlls or enabling their widespread lIse. Steps coold Ie taken to bhlnt the social
Ineaning of indidual actions that currently convey positive social meaning |but harmi
envilOll

lle nt.

:"I Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note ,13, at 9 I.3.

the
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payment leads one to be morally culpable for causing the destruction of
an environmental asset.''-'

My Chesapeake Bay example may demonstrate one way in which
the WTA-WTP concept could be used to address second generation
sources. Can the notion of "Chesapeake Bay Watershed - Don't
Dump" be made more powerful by changing the wording to "Dumping
Saves Cash - But Not the Chesapeake Bay"? Certainly an advertising
agency could draft a catchier phrase, but the idea is clear. The
erstwhile dumper is forced to confront dumping as being equivalent to
accepting d payment to allow environmental damage. Similarly, a
shaming punishment for the violator of a stormwater requirement
might be phrased to capture this concept. Rather than publishing the
fact of non-compliance in a local paper, the more effective approach
might be to phrase the message in terms of the dollar savings to the
violator for risking or creating an impact to the water quality of the
Chesapeake Bay. The effect of these changes in the framing of the
message, driven by the social meaning of the distinction between
WTA and WTP, could be tested.
VI. CONCLUSION

The social meanings conveyed by the command and control system
may help explain the public's environmental' myths, as well as its
reluctance to"address its role in causing second generation problems.
These second generation problems will comprise a principal challenge
to regulators and policymakers in the next twenty years, yet the
sources of the problems in many cases will be well beyond the reach of
the command and control methods familiar to regulators. The sources
also may be beyond the traditional prescriptions of economists who
have provided the foundation for some of the more innovative
modifications to the command and control system in the last twenty
years. This essay has attempted to use the concept of social Meaning
to stimulate further thought and research regarding the role that social
meaning may play in efforts to identify new legal and extra-legal
prescriptions for second generation problems.

I
Id./ at 9 14. See Boyce et al., An E.perimental Eraminationo/hitrinsi Vahes as a Source n/
the It'T.4-1TP Disparity,82 AM. ECON. Rrv. 1366, i M7 ( 992).

